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Introduction: Cognitive Bases, Individuation and Emotional Attitudes 
A view of current prominence in the philosophy of emotion is that emotional experiences 
are not self-standing intentional experiences of, or relations to, their particular objects (i.e., 
persons, animals, events, or states of affairs including these things). Instead, they inherit the 
particular objects they have, and at least part of their intentional content, from what have 
been called their cognitive bases. Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni articulate what is 
arguably the strongest form of this view, claiming that ‘emotions have a content because other 
psychological states provide them with one’.1 
On this view, consider my experience of fear when confronted with an Alsatian bounding 
towards me. Presumably, the intentional base is a multi-modal sense-perceptual experience, 
in which I can see the large dog, its sharp teeth, and accelerating forward movement, but also 
hear its loud barks and thundering paws, and some of that content will be taken up in the fear 
experience. Next, consider reading a novel and finding myself amused by the behaviour of 
one of the characters. My engagement with the fiction, which might involve a combination 
of (propositional) imagining and visualising one of the characters (the intentional bases), 
represents their actions as being a certain way – say as not in keeping with the norms of their 
society, and engaging in endeavours which are poorly planned – and some of that content 
will be taken up into the content of amusement. The cognitive bases of emotions 
presumptively cover the full range of experiential attitudes and modes, from occurrent 
thoughts and judgements, episodic memories, imaginations (both propositional and 
experiential), and sense-perceptual experiences.2 
Suppose we accept Deonna and Teroni’s claim about how emotions come to have the 
contents that they do. One implication is that emotions whose intentional contents differ in 
																																																						
1 Deonna and Teroni 2015; 299 (my emphasis). See also Teroni 2007; 404 on the ‘basing thesis’; Tappolet 2016: 
26-29. See Lyons 1980: 104-6 and Teroni 2007: 395-415 for the notion of a particular object in emotion theory. 
2 The term ‘cognitive base’ is slightly misleading since it might wrongly give the impression that the relevant 
states are cognitive in the sense associated with judgements and thoughts, but that isn’t the case as the examples 
show.  
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terms of the modal and temporal properties of the relevant particular object – because the 
intentional contents on which they are based differ in these respects – nonetheless need not 
differ qua emotion-type. For example, fear in response to a currently perceived aggressive 
dog need not be different qua emotion-type, from fear in response to a ‘mental image’ of an 
aggressive dog. Likewise, occurrent joy in response to a visualised scene need not differ qua 
emotion-type, from occurrent joy in response to a perceived scene. They would putatively 
be the same emotional attitudes, namely fear and joy, but just directed towards particular 
objects which happen to instantiate different temporal and modal properties (e.g., current 
and actual vs future and possible). Put otherwise, they would be instances of the fearful or 
joyful way – whatever way precisely that is – of relating to different objects and contents.3  
It is a further task, on this ‘attitudinal’ approach, to individuate emotion-types in a 
satisfactory way, specifying at the level of attitude rather than intentional content, what makes 
a particular emotional episode one of fear rather than joy, sadness rather than melancholy, 
and so forth.4  The details of such proposals will not be my focus here. Rather I want to 
hone in on the following claim:  
 
Same-emotional attitude, different content claim: For every emotion-attitude type E, it is possible 
for E to be grounded in the awareness of both sense-perceptually present objects and 
merely imagined objects (as provided by different cognitive bases). 
 
If this claim holds then the fact that the cognitive base differs – say between fear towards a 
sense-perceptually present particular object and fear towards a visualised particular object 
(the relevant basing states being sense perception in the one case and imagining in the other) 
– does not fundamentally determine the emotional experience as the type of emotional experience 
it is. Instead, it is the fact that we are relating to those particular objects, in the relevant type-
specific emotional way of fear (however precisely that is cashed out) that determines what type 
of emotion we are undergoing. In the case just described what we have is the same emotional 
attitude, towards different contents.  
																																																						
3 For more on the idea that the attitude-content distinction applies to emotions see Deonna and Teroni 2015. 
Note, the possibility of diagnosing two situations as involving the same content but a different attitude is one reason 
one may have to endorse the attitude-content distinction.  
4 See Deonna and Teroni 2012; Ch.7; 2015 for one approach (cf. Müller 2017). Deonna and Teroni think that 
what type-identifies different emotions are their attendant attitudinal phenomenologies, which is claimed to be a kind 
of action-ready bodily phenomenology (see section 3 for discussion of this view).  
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This paper argues that this claim is mistaken, at least if it is taken in an unrestricted sense 
as applying emotions across the board (there might be a restricted version of the same emotion-
attitude, different content claim that could be upheld; my focus here will be on the unrestricted 
version). By appealing to the specific case of imagination, the same emotional-attitude, different 
content claim will be challenged. More specifically, the argument turns on showing that it is a 
mistake to try to account for the difference between occurrently fearing/admiring/despising 
(etc.) a sense-perceptually present object and occurrently fearing/admiring/despising (etc.) a 
visualised object in terms of the same emotional attitude, different content claim. This is because 
there is arguably a fundamental difference in emotion-type between emotions that are 
enjoyed in response to ‘real’ sense-perceptually present objects and ‘irreal’ objects as given 
in experiential imagining. Drawing on phenomenological observations made by Jean-Paul 
Sartre, supplemented with independently plausible considerations, I argue that there is 
sufficient reason to recognise a distinct class of emotion-types not acknowledged in the 
current literature, which I call affective imaginings. These affective imaginings contrast with 
emotional experiences whose cognitive bases are sense-perceptual experiences (what I call 
affective perceptions). The contrast, however, is not exclusively a matter of content – which 
would be compatible with the same emotional-attitude, different content claim – but turns on the 
way the relevantly different contents across these cases modifies the attitudinal character of 
the emotional experience.5 
Before proceeding, let me say something about the approach that will be taken, the 
motivations for the paper, and how its thesis impacts on broader issues in philosophy of 
emotion and mind. First, my interest will be on emotional experiences rather than emotions per 
se; I provide a characterisation of emotional experiences in section 1. Connected to this, the 
kind of type-individuation that will interest me is personal level intentional individuation. This 
is a kind of individuation of experiences which is intended to capture (at least in significant 
part) how things seem from the subject’s perspective. As such, this kind of type-identification 
of emotions principally turns on the phenomenal character of the relevant experiences 
(where this can include how the object seems to the subject).6 
																																																						
5  An Attitudinalist could accept a version of this conclusion, giving up the same emotional-attitude, different 
content claim (at least for imagination vs perception contrast), and claim that affective perception vs affective imagining 
involves two distinct attitudes that are somehow related (see section 3 for discussion).  
6 NB: one can individuate emotional experiences in non-phenomenal and non-intentional ways. For example, 
in terms of their causal-functional role, or the neurophysiological state on which they are based. In addition, it 
should be noted that personal level intentional individuation can be individuation from the third-person as well 
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Second, what follows contributes to the ongoing project of specifying conditions for 
individuating emotion-types. Indeed, it is a central part of any plausible theory of emotion 
that it should provide a way of individuating different emotion-types. At this point, it is worth 
noting that the dominant view has been to do so in terms of emotions’ putative evaluative 
content. This is the approach taken by evaluativist views such as Judgementalism and 
Perceptualism.7 While there is much to be said about this issue, the current paper will not 
discuss the role of values in individuating emotions, and what follows concerning the 
differences in content and attitude between putative affective perceptions vs affective 
imaginings does not turn on whether either or both have evaluative content (I briefly return 
to this point at the end of section 2). 
Connected to the above, I do not mean to suggest that individuating emotional 
experiences exclusively in terms of their ‘content’ rather than their ‘attitude’ has the edge 
over the alternative (individuating emotions exclusively in terms of ‘attitude’ rather than 
‘content’) when it comes to the cases at issue (putative affective imaginings vs affective 
perceptions). As will be clear from the discussion in section 2, understanding the phenomena 
at issue requires distinctive contributions on both the ‘attitude’ and ‘content’ side. In that 
sense, it should be clear that an approach that would seek to individuate affective imagining 
solely in terms of some proprietary or sui generis content would fail to capture the 
distinctiveness of the states at issue.  Finally, as should be clear from the preceding, this paper 
helps to clarify the complex relationship between both emotions and perceptual and 
imaginative experience, articulating a picture that is more complicated that is often assumed 
in contemporary discussions of emotions and their cognitive bases. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 makes distinctions between different cases in 
which emotion and imagination are connected, clarifying affective imaginings. Drawing on 
Sartre’s discussion of affectivity and imagination, section 2 puts forward considerations in 
favour of the view that affective imaginings and affective perceptions exhibit content-based 
differences that modify the attitudinal character of the respective emotional experiences. It 
then explains why this means that the same emotional-attitude, different content claim cannot be 
upheld between these contrast cases. Section 3 then suggest ways the defender of the same-
																																																						
as the first-person perspective; the sensitivity we are attempting to capture is that of the experiencing subject’s point 
of view.  
7 See Nussbaum 2001 and Solomon 1976 for Judgementalism; and Poellner 2016: 8-11; Döring 2007: 363 94; 
Johnston 2001: 181-214; Tappolet 2016; De Sousa 2002: 255; Tappolet and Rossi 2019 for Perceptualism.	
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emotional attitude, different content claim might respond, arguing that none of them is without 




1. Distinctions between cases  
In what follows I provide considerations in favour of acknowledging the psychological reality 
of a proprietary class of emotional experiences I call affective imaginings. However, there 
are several states and experiences with which they may be confused, so it is helpful to begin 
by drawing distinctions between different states in which emotion and imagination (of some 
form) are related. 
 
(a) Propositional Imagining of Emotion: I imagine that <I’ll be angry if he comes 
home late again>. 
 
(b) Experiential Imagining of Emotion: I visualise being reunited with a long-
lost friend and also experientially imagine (whether ‘from the inside’ or ‘from 
the outside) feeling joy.8 
 
(c) Propositional/Experiential Imagining of Emotion causing Emotion: I am in a 
state of either (a) or (b) and being so causes me to undergo a bone fide emotional 
experience.  
 
Let me first say something about (a) and (b). They are both states of what we can call imagining 
affect. In neither do I undergo an emotional experience, rather the emotion is part of the 
intentional content, it is part of what my mental state of imagination represents. 
This contrast is, however, not particularly informative without a substantive sense of 
what is meant by emotions and emotional experiences. Emotions, as I will understand them 
here, are intentional experiences. More specifically, they are occurrent episodes, usually of 
																																																						
8 There is a question concerning what it would be to experientially imagine oneself ‘from the inside’ undergoing 
an emotion without this being an instance of an actual emotional experience. See Hopkins 2011 for a discussion 
of the options with particular reference to Sartre 2004.  
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relatively short duration, enjoyed by individuals at particular times.9 As such, emotions are 
first-person states that have a what-it-is-likeness; there is something-it-is-like to be the subject 
of episodic fear, jealousy, love, shame, regret, or admiration, to experience feelings of fear, 
jealousy love, shame, regret, and admiration. Emotional experiences are, therefore, conscious 
intentional experiences with a phenomenology, although talk of phenomenology is merely a 
placeholder for a more detailed account of the what-it-is-likeness of emotional experience. At 
a minimum, emotional experiences are intentional experiences in the sense that they are 
directed towards particular objects, such as persons, animals, events, or states of affairs 
including these things (which are provided by the cognitive bases of the emotional 
experience). 
Now in (a) and (b) I don’t undergo an emotional experience but merely represent the 
possible occurrence of emotion. There are significant differences between (a) and (b), 
especially in terms of the relative complexity of the content and the way they represent emotion 
(propositional vs experiential).10 Nonetheless, there is a significant distinction to be drawn 
between states of imagining affect and what can be more properly called affective imaginings, where 
we undergo a bone fide emotional experience as characterised above. Richard Wollheim, 
somewhat confusingly for our purposes, labels complex imaginings of the type exemplified 
by (c) affective imaginings. There are interesting things to be said about imaginings of this 
type, in which a state of imagining affect (as I have called it) precipitates an emotional 
experience, specifically clarifying the relation between the imagined emotion and the 
emotional experience, and relevant constraints on emotion-types between the imagined 
emotions and the emotional experience it causes. However, these will not be my focus here.11 
Consider the following states: 
 
																																																						
9 See Tappolet 2016: Ch.1 and Deonna and Teroni 2012: Ch.1 for a similar conception. Goldie (2000: 5; Ch.2) 
has a broader use of the term ‘emotion’ as contrasted with an emotional experience or episode. He thinks of 
emotions proper as being embedded within a more complex narrative structure which implicates a range of 
related states (both occurrent and dispositional), such as moods and character traits. 
10 One further noteworthy point is that there is arguably a constraint on how the object is represented and the 
relevant imagined emotional response. For example, to imagine a particular object motivating, for example, 
fear, one might think one has to represent it as in some way or other fearsome or dangerous (so one has to represent 
the object under a fitting evaluative aspect). 
11 See Wollheim 1984: 79-83.  
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Affective Propositional Imagining: fear/happy/sad (etc.) that P, where P is an 
<imagined proposition>12 
 
Affective Experiential Imagining: fear of an <imagined particular object> 
 
Let me first say something about affective propositional imagining. An example would be fearing 
that <Margret Thatcher will rise from the grave and win another general election>. In such 
a case the cognitive base of my fear would be the relevant propositional imagining (or if one 
prefers imagined proposition), which has a content that would be taken up as the content of 
my fear. The precise character of propositional imagining need not occupy us here, but there 
are two central options for characterising these kinds of affective propositional imaginings 
for our purposes. The deflationary characterisation would be that at least typically in such 
cases there isn’t an occurrent emotional experience; rather what we have is something akin 
to timidly or fearfully supposing. And there need be no occurrent emotion present when I 
‘fearfully suppose’ that P (as indeed there need not be in any more general case of ‘fear-that’). 
This kind of deflationary reading is analogous to the way that ‘Mary sees that the answer is 7’ 
(or ‘I see what you mean’), usually has nothing much to do with actually using one’s eyes. 
Alternatively, one might prefer to characterise such cases as at least sometimes involving 
occurrent emotions in the sense of emotional experiences characterised above. Whichever 
reading of propositional affective imaginings is preferred, however, we can pose a more 
cogent challenge to the same emotional-attitude different content claim – which is our target – if we 
turn to affective experiential imaginings proper. 
First, it will be helpful to clarify in detail what experiential imagining consists in. Experiential 
imagining has a ‘rich phenomenology’, in a way that is analogous with sense-perceptual 
experience and is to be distinguished from whatever phenomenology cognitive states or 
experiences have (if they do); indeed, the paradigmatic example of experiential imagining is 
visualising, or the ‘having of a mental image’ (I take these as synonymous is what follows). 
Reflecting this, experiential imagining is paradigmatically objectual, in the sense that it involves 
a visualisation of a particular object (person, animal, event, or state of affairs), rather than an 
attitudinal relation to a proposition.13 Further to this, the kind of experiential imagining I 
																																																						
12 One might think affective propositional imagining no different from simply fearing that P. If one thinks that 
propositional imagination is just supposition then such cases just turn out as cases of fear-that (see discussion 
below).  
13 Note: propositional imagining may be accompanied by a ‘mental image’ although it need not be.  
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focus on here will be experiential imaginings ‘from the inside’ or from the first-person point 
of view of the subject, rather than experiential imagining ‘from the outside’, that is when I 
visualise, for example, myself talking to someone (in which I represent myself in the visualised 
scene).14 Finally, experiential imaginings, again in analogy with sense-perceptual experience, 
are non-doxastic states. That is to say, they neither are constituted by nor necessarily involve 
occurrent beliefs or judgements. Put somewhat crudely, just as seeing is not (or at least not 
necessarily) judging something to be the case, neither is visualising (or the having of a ‘mental 
image’) judging something to be the case.15 
Now, in considering the states I am calling ‘affective experiential imaginings’ (hereafter 
just affective imaginings), it is important to be explicit that we are presumptively dealing with 
instances of bone fide emotional experiences, rather than states of imagining affect which happen 
to be instances of experiential imaginings (e.g., states of kind (b) considered above). After 
all, the defender of the same emotional-attitude, different content claim, would willingly concede 
that a state of imagining affect, which involves the representation of the occurrence of an 
emotion – say an experiential imagining which involves a representation of myself as angry 
– is a different kind of attitude (or an experience in a different mode) from an emotional 
experience of anger. The two cases are not ones across which the same emotional-attitude, different 
content claim is supposed to hold, since one is the emotional attitude of anger and the other 
is a state in the attitude or mode of imagination, which happens to involve a representation 
of its subject as angry.   
It is worth noting that some may be sceptical about the very existence of affective 
imaginings so understood, preferring to think that all putative cases of affective imaginings 
should be either modelled after states (a) or (b), so imagining one had an emotion, or state 
(c), that is where a propositional or experiential imagining of emotion causes an emotion. I 
think it is reasonably obvious that affective (experiential) imaginings are a bone fide 
phenomenon reflected in ordinary folk discourse: “I was genuinely moved by imagining her 
face”; “I was emotionally devastated by visualising the fate that would befall her”; “the 
imagined reunion filled me with joy”. In any case, I will be assuming that affective imaginings, 
																																																						
14 On imagining ‘from the inside’, see Williams 1973; Peacocke 1985 and Wollheim 1984: 72-4. Note, there is 
a case to be made that all experiential imagining (as visualizing) is ‘from the inside’ in the sense that it is from 
some point of view or other. 
15 See Evans 1982: 123-4 for discussion of belief-independence in the case of perception.  
 9 
which minimally are emotional experiences which have experiential imaginings as their 
cognitive base, are a real psychological phenomenon.16 
With these clarifications made we can turn to our central question. Is it the case that an 
emotional experience of anger, say, which has an instance of experiential imagining as its 
cognitive base, and so which gets (at least part of) its content from some such state – what I 
am calling an affective imagining – is no different qua emotion-type from an emotional 
experience of anger which has a sense-perceptual experience as its cognitive base (such that 
this pair is an instance of the same emotion-type). Put otherwise, does it plausibly (or not) 
make a difference to the very type of emotion we are enjoying that its cognitive base is a state 
of experiential imagining vs sensory perception. If we are tempted to answer in the 
affirmative, the idea would presumably be that somehow the relevant content modifies the 
emotional attitude, such that even though we might report or classify the different 
experiences using the same emotion-attitude terms – say anger in both cases – we are in fact 
dealing with fundamentally different kinds of emotional experience. The surface grammar of 
such reports or classifications would be significantly misleading in this respect (I provide 
further remarks on the respect in which the surface grammar of the relevant emotional 
reports is misleading in section 3). The next section considers observations made by Jean-
Paul Sartre in The Imaginary, which motivate an affirmative answer to the above question.  
 
2. Two Fundamental Classes of Affective Experiences 
2.1 Preliminaries 
Sartre’s discussion of the nature of experiential imagining in The Imaginary includes several 
more or less contentious claims that won’t be important for our purposes.17 He also discusses 
a variety of cases, some of which might be more properly classified as cases of imagining 
affects.18 Here, though is the key statement of the view that is relevant for our purposes:  
 
																																																						
16 The ‘sceptical’ view is discussed more often in the case of the connection between emotion and memory (see 
Debus 2007 and Teroni 2020).  
17 These include (a) the causal role of imagination (b) the specific intentional ‘matter’ of imagining, and what 
Sartre calls the ‘analogon’, and (c) the connection between imagination and human freedom. See Hopkins 
forthcoming, Kriegel 2015, and Casey 1981 for overviews, which include discussions of these themes. See also 
Poellner forthcoming for a discussion of a specific case of Sartrean affective imaginings, namely affective 
anticipations of future value.  
18 See Sartre 2004: 136-148.  
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Thus, from the very fact of the extraordinary difference that separates the object 
as imaged from the real, two irreducible classes of feeling can be distinguished: 
genuine feelings and imaginary feelings. By this latter adjective, I do not mean that 
the feelings are themselves irreal, but that they never appear except in the face 
of irreal objects… (Sartre 2004: 146) 
 
Sartre is making the distinction we drew in the previous section, between imagining affects, in 
which the ‘feelings are themselves irreal’ (in his terms), and affective imaginings, where the 
latter are bone fide emotional experiences. Such affective imaginings are supposedly distinctive 
in virtue of being ‘feelings in the face of the irreal’ and are claimed to be of a fundamentally 
different kind from ‘feelings in the face of the real’, that is emotional experiences based on 
sense-perceptions, that is whose cognitive bases are sense-perceptions. 
Now it should be clear that if something in the vicinity of Sartre’s claim can be vindicated 
– that there are two irreducible classes or kinds of emotional experiences, affective 
perceptions and affective imaginings – then the same emotional-attitude, different intentional content 
claim, which is our critical target, will be false. Here is why: that the relevant emotion has as 
its cognitive base either a sense-perceptual experience or an imaginative experience will not 
amount merely to a difference in the respective contents, but will somehow result in a 
difference in felt attitude. As Sartre puts the same point earlier in his discussion: ‘…there is a 
difference in nature between feelings in the face of the real and feelings in the face of the 
imaginary. For example, love completely varies accordingly to whether its object is present or 
absent’.19 As such, and sticking with the case of love, there would not be one emotional 
attitude, namely love, which was shared across the two cases, but with different intentional 
contents. Rather, love ‘in the face of the real’ and love ‘in the face of irreal’, would mark out 
fundamentally different types of emotional experience – in the one case an affective perception and 
in the other an affective imagining. It is important to note that Sartre’s claim is fundamentally 
a contrastive one, such that it is only by considering, in detail, the differences between the 
respective cases that he thinks we will come to recognise the irreducibility of the two classes 
of emotional experiences.  
Hopefully, this preliminary discussion has been sufficient to make clear what precisely 
the view is that would challenge our target claim, and why it does so. The next step is to 
consider whether we have good reason to accept Sartre’s view. 
																																																						
19 Sartre 2004: 143; both emphases mine.  
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There are a set of considerations which he presents in his discussion of these points 
which are not sufficient given that – as outlined in the introduction and so to repeat – the 
kind of type-individuation of emotion that is of interest here is personal level intentional 
individuation, where that intends to capture how things seem from the subject’s perspective 
(turning on the phenomenal character of the relevant emotional experiences). These concern 
what we might call the functional profiles of the contrasting emotion-types (putative affective 
perceptions vs affective imaginings), which concern the different ways the emotions 
motivate ‘conduct’, where we can understand that to mean actions, motivational states (e.g., 
desires, wishes), further feelings, beliefs and judgements etc. It should be uncontroversial 
that an emotional experience directed towards a sense-perceptually present aggressive 
individual will motivate ‘conduct’ in a significantly different way from an emotional 
experience directed towards an aggressive individual who I merely visualise. Indeed, the 
desires I am likely to form in the face of a ‘real’ (that is sense-perceptually present) aggressive 
individual and, say, a merely visualised aggressive individual will differ significantly.  
Yet, given our interest in personal level intentional individuation, nothing necessarily 
follows in terms of differences in emotion-type from differences in the kinds of states the 
relevant emotion motivates, as those which are downstream of the emotional experience 
itself (even if those downstream states have a distinctive phenomenology). Indeed, it is not 
surprising that emotional experiences which have sense-perceptions as their cognitive base, 
contrasted with those which have experiential imaginings as their cognitive base, will have 
different functional profiles or roles in our mental economies.20 And it is plausible that, with 
relevant modifications for the affective cases, these differences mirror the differences in the 
functional roles that sense-perceptual experience and experiential imaginings more generally 
play in our mental economies.21 
 
2.2 Feelings in the face of the real and feelings in the face of the irreal 
So, what considerations can be marshalled in favour of positing two ‘irreducible classes’ of 
emotions? Let’s start by examining claims Sartre makes about ‘feelings in the face of the real’, 
or what I am calling affective perceptions. Here is how he describes them: 
																																																						
20 NB: naturally, a functionalist about attitudes may well see these differences in functional profiles as 
warranting a distinction between two different levels of attitudes.  
21	This point is familiar from the paradox of fiction literature (see Radford 1975; Walton 1978: 5-27; Cova and 
Teroni 2016: 930-942). I save detailed engagement with that literature and the Sartrean picture I am developing 
for a separate occasion. 
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When feeling is directed on at a real thing, currently perceived, the thing sends back to 
it, like a screen, the light that it receives from it. And so, by a game of back and forth, 
the feeling is constantly enriched, at the same time that the object imbibes affective 
qualities. There follows, for the feeling, a particular depth and richness. The affective 
state follows the course of attention, it develops with each new discovery of perception, 
it assimilates all the aspects of the object; as a result, its development remains 
unpredictable because, while remaining spontaneous, it is subordinated to the 
development of the real correlate. (Sartre 2004: 139) 
 
I want to draw out the following two claims from the above passage. (1) ‘Feelings in the face 
of the real’ enjoy a particular kind of ‘depth and richness’ (2) The ‘depth and richness’ of 
those feelings is a reflection of the ‘depth and richness’ of the ‘real correlate’, that is the 
sense-perceptually given particular object – as such, the feelings are ‘enriched’ by the ‘real 
correlate’.22  
Before analysing these claims in detail, it will be helpful to introduce some terminology 
to translate Sartre’s claims into the terms of contemporary philosophy of emotion. The 
‘feelings’ we are going to be referring to in the following discussion are what characterise the 
attitudinal side of the experience (or the ‘subject-side’), as contrasted with the content of the 
experience, (or the ‘object-side’). In the case of emotions, which involve phenomenologically 
salient ‘feelings’ that are not to be cashed out exclusively in terms of being presented with an 
object (an object making itself manifest), but involve ‘responding’ ‘reacting’ or ‘being moved’ 
by the relevant object, it is plausible that there is what we can call an attendant attitudinal 
phenomenology (as what has often been characterised as a kind of ‘felt aboutness’ or ‘feeling 
towards’).23 It is the relation between the content of the relevant emotional experience – say 
the ‘real object which is perceptually present’ – and its attendant attitudinal phenomenology, 
the supposed ‘feelings involved’, that is in contention. That Sartre himself is operating with 
this distinction is clear from the above passages.24 
																																																						
22 Sartre also connects the ‘depth’ to what he calls ‘affective qualities’; these look to be evaluative characteristics 
– see the end of section for discussion.   
23 See Goldie 2000: ch.3 on ‘feelings towards’; see also Kriegel 2014: 424; Poellner 2016; Müller 2019; see 
Deonna and Teorni 2015: 308 for this notion of attendant attitudinal phenomenology. 
24 The distinction between attitude and content roughly mirrors the distinction between ‘noesis’ and ‘noema’ 
in classical phenomenology with which Sartre was familiar from the work of Husserl.    
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With these important distinctions in check, what is this supposed ‘depth’ to the sense-
perceptual object that Sartre evocatively refers to? Getting clear on this is essential to 
understanding claims (1) and (2) above – and doing so will require a detour into the 
philosophy of perception. Sartre does not spell out this notion of ‘depth’ as clearly as one 
might like. Still, on a plausible reconstruction, the thought in the non-affective case can 
initially be framed as follows: the objects of sense-perceptual experience are experienced as 
in some sense ‘inexhaustible’, presenting in experience in such a way that there always seems 
to be more to the particular object that can be given in one sense-perceptual encounter – this 
is presumably at least partly why Sartre talks of ‘richness’. In this sense, sense-perceptual 
experience, for Sartre at least, always involves the possibility of learning more about the 
relevant object through sustained and attentive observation (and crucially further perceptual 
experience).25  
Consider the following example. Standing in front of a house, we are visually presented 
with its front-side, given in terms of a particular array of colour and spatial properties from 
our perspectival location. Nonetheless, our visual experience is as of a full three-dimensional 
entity (or often purports to be). We enjoy a visual experience as of a façade of a house, not as of 
a mere façade (e.g., a stage-prop). How is it that we enjoy a visual experience as of the relevant 
full three-dimensional entity despite the fact that we are limited in any given instance – that 
is, any token visual experience – to being experientially presented with the side(s) facing us 
from a specific spatial perspective or point of view. The following appeal to the idea of 
‘depth’ provides an answer. For a subject to enjoy a visual experience as of a full three-
dimensional spatial object that visual experience must somehow ‘go beyond itself’ – as we 
put it above, there must seem to be more to the particular object than what is given in that token 
visual experience. More clearly, it must in some sense involve or refer to those occluded or 
presently unseen back-sides (and voluminous insides) which (i) are not sense-perceptually 
given (which are strictly not visually experienced), and (ii) which cannot be sense-perceptually 
given while the subject is occupying the spatial perspective or ‘vantage point’ on the object 
that they currently are. Borrowing a term from classical phenomenology, we can refer to the 
above idea, generalised across cases, as the horizonal depth of perceptual experience.26 More could 
be said on this complex topic, but this will suffice to frame the following claim:  
																																																						
25 See Sartre 2004: 8. 
26 For discussion of this idea in classical phenomenology see Husserl 1973 §8; 1982; §41 and §44; 1977 §19; 
1997 §16, §24 (for an overview of Husserl’s views on these issues see Drummond 1990: Ch.8); Gurwitsch 2010 
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Depth claim: sense-perceptual experience has a horizonal depth – there always seems to be 
‘more’ to the particular object that is given in any token perceptual experience.27 
 
The second aspect of sense-perceptual experience that will be relevant for our purposes 
concerns its purported ‘passivity’ (the ‘subordination’ of the subject to ‘the real correlate’ in 
Sartre’s terms). In at least paradigmatic sense-perceptual experience (that is which does not 
concern the experience of phosphenes or after-images), the particular object seems to enjoy 
a kind of subject-independence manifest in the myriad of different ways it exhibits a kind of 
‘resistance’ to the subject and their intentions. As such, the subject’s relation to the relevant 
object has a somewhat passive character (which as we shall see for Sartre starkly contrasts 
with our relation to the ‘irreal object’ as given in experiential imagining). For example, as 
much as I might desire it, I cannot simply at will (or by sheer will) make the brown table 
located in front of me change colour to be fluorescent purple, any more than I can simply at 
will alter its size or location (the objects various properties seem independent from me). 
Further to this, at least at the phenomenological level, the objects of sense-perception do not 
appear to be sustained in existence by my own activity. We can frame this aspect as follows: 
 
Passivity claim: sense-perceptual experience exhibits a kind of ‘resistance’: its particular 
object (and its properties) is not subject to my ‘will’ and manifests a kind of subject-
independence. 
 
These claims about the ‘depth’ and ‘passivity’ of sense-perception, while warranting further 
detailed independent explication, are prima facie plausible. Indeed, that sense-perceptual 
experience manifests this kind of phenomenological passivity is fairly widely accepted.28 And 
the point about the horizonal depth of perceptual experience, seems importantly connected to a 
fundamental staple of contemporary philosophy of perception, namely that perception is one 
																																																						
Part 4; Merleau-Ponty 2002 (1945): 6. For discussion of this theme in contemporary philosophy of mind see 
Schellenberg 2007: 604, 613; Kelly 2004: 98; Noë 2004: 60; Church 2011: 36; Nanay 2009: 307-9. 
27 See Sartre (2004: 8): ‘One must learn objects, which is to say, multiply the possible points of view on them. 
The object itself is the synthesis of all these appearances. The perception of an object is therefore a 
phenomenon of an infinity of aspects. What does this signify for us? The necessity of making a tour of objects’.	
28 See Siegel 2011: Ch.7, for a discussion of this point. 
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of the (if not the) fundamental way we have of learning about ‘the world’.29 Let us now return 
to the main thread of the discussion.  
The reconstructed Sartrean claim then concerning ‘feelings in the face of the real’ 
(putative affective perceptions) is that the ‘feelings involved’ – what we above called the 
attendant attitudinal phenomenology – somehow come to ‘reflect’ these content-based 
features exhibited in the ‘Depth claim’ and ‘Passivity claim’, and so come to have what we 
can call ‘depth-character’ and ‘passive-character’. Sartre illustrates this point, capturing both 
the relevant depth and the passivity involved, in the case of love for Annie when she is sense-
perceptually present. He says: ‘My love-passion was subordinated to its object: as such, I was 
constantly informed by it, it constantly surprised me, at each moment I have to remake it, 
readapt to it...’30 The idea is that the attendant attitudinal phenomenology (the ‘feelings’) have 
inherited, and now reflect, the ‘depth’ of the object. The feelings, therefore, will seem to the 
subject to have (will be phenomenologically manifest as having) an ‘inexhaustible’ depth, also 
exhibiting a fundamentally ‘subordinate’ or ‘passive’ relation to object (being ‘drawn along’ 
with the object as it were). 
Now, and remaining at the level of phenomenological description, Sartre is explicit that 
there is important phenomenal contrast to be made in the case of ‘feelings in the face of the 
irreal’ – putative sui generis affective imaginings. Let’s stick with the example of love, 
specifically experiential ‘love for Annie’ (I consider a further example in 2.3). Sartre tells us 
that the relevant ‘positive element (the impulses towards Annie)’, the ‘feelings towards’ – 
what we have called its attendant attitudinal phenomenology of the episode – is ‘profoundly 
modified’,31 further claiming that ‘…Annie as imaged is incomparable to the Annie delivered 
to perception. She has undergone the modification of irreality and our feeling has undergone 
a correlative modification.32 But what more precisely in this modification? In an informative 
passage, Sartre seeks to answer this question and further clarifies the contrast: 
 
...the feeling is degraded in its richness, its inexhaustible depth came from the 
object: there is always more to love in the object than I in fact love…the idea 
that Annie as individual reality is inexhaustible and that, correlatively, my love 
																																																						
29 See, for example, the discussion of perception in Evans 1984; McDowell 1994; Siegel 2011; Peacocke 2001; 
Martin 1992.  
30 Sartre 2004: 134-4. 
31 Sartre 2004: 143. 
32 Ibid: 144; both emphases mine. 
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for her is inexhaustible. So, the feeling that at each moment surpasses itself was 
surrounded by a vast halo of possibilities. But these possibilities have disappeared 
just like the real object…It follows that the feeling is never more than what it is. It 
now has a deep poverty. (Sartre 2004: 143)  
 
There is much in the above passage that confirms our analysis of the case of ‘feelings in the 
face of the real’, but let’s focus on the ‘modification’ described by Sartre.  
According to Sartre when we consider a case where we move from an emotional 
experience in which the cognitive base is a sense-perceptual experience, to an affective 
imagining, where the cognitive base is an experiential imagining, we do not merely get a 
change in content (which of course we do in relevant respects specified by the ‘Depth claim’ 
and the ‘Passivity claim’), but rather the ‘feelings involved’ – the attendant attitudinal 
phenomenology – is modified. What though, more precisely, is the character of this supposed 
modified affective phenomenology? Sartre says the feelings are degraded and have a ‘deep 
poverty, but it would be helpful to have a more substantive, less metaphorical 
characterisation.    
We can say more on this score by emphasising that the ‘feelings’ involved in affective 
imagining, due to the way its object is experienced, lack the kind of ‘depth-character’ that is 
claimed to be critical for Sartre in the sense-perceptual case – that is in the case of affective 
perception. Sartre provides a nice gloss on the contrast when he writes that ‘in every person 
that we love, for the very reason of their inexhaustible richness, there is something that 
surpasses us, an independence, an impenetrability, that requires perpetually renewed efforts 
of approximation. The irreal object conserves nothing of this impenetrability: it is never more 
than what we know of it’.33 The consequence is that the attendant attitudinal phenomenology 
of such affective imaginings ‘takes up’ or is ‘informed’ by the ‘impoverished’ character of the 
object, such that just as the irreal object is ‘never more than what we know of it’ (the Depth-
claim no longer holding), so too the feelings towards that irreal object is, as Sartre puts it in 
the above quote, ‘never more than what it is’; that is what it would be for the attitudinal 
phenomenology in the case of affective imaginings to lack depth-character. On this basis, it 
makes sense why Sartre considers the following phenomenological description of the 
relevant attendant attitudinal phenomenology of affective imagining to be accurate: such 
‘feelings’ in affective imaginings are ‘degraded, poor, jerky, spasmodic, schematic’34 insofar 
																																																						
33 Ibid: 145. 
34 Ibid: 145. 
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as they do not have the ‘inexhaustible richness’ of the ‘real’ perceived object as given in sense-
perception to ‘feed off’.35  
Buttressing this analysis somewhat though we can also say more about what has changed 
in terms of the Passivity-claim. For Sartre, the Passivity-claim while true of (paradigmatic) 
sense-perceptual experience is definitively not applicable to experiential imagining. Such that 
the subject’s relation to the object is fundamentally active rather than passive: the irreal object, 
as Sartre puts it, is sustained ‘by means of a kind of continuous autocreation, a kind of restless 
tension’.36 The idea that all imagining is ‘spontaneous’ in this sense – as Sartre sometimes 
claims – is problematic (think for example of unbidden images),37 but there is a more 
plausible phenomenological claim in the vicinity which is suitable for our purposes. Namely, 
that experiential imagining which has a reasonable duration, will typically involve a 
phenomenology of actively maintaining the image.38 This is an important phenomenological 
contrast with sense-perceptual experience, but we might wonder how it manifests itself more 
concretely in the case of ‘feelings in the face of the irreal’, and the contrast between affective 
imaginings vs affective perceptions. One plausible thought is that the ‘feelings involved’ (the 
attendant attitudinal phenomenology) will feel to be somehow dependent on our maintaining 
of the ‘image’; such that if for whatever reason I was to cease to be able to maintain the 
image the feelings would ‘dry up’. And while it would be a mistake to characterise the feelings 
themselves as ‘chosen’ in any strong sense,39 the ‘restless tension’ which reflects the way in 
which subject has to actively maintain the image (by ‘continuous autocreation’), is also part 
of what gives the attendant attitudinal phenomenology that ‘degraded, poor, jerky, 
spasmodic, schematic’ character Sartre describes. It is no doubt controversial whether 
Sartre’s description rings true for all cases of affective imagining. Indeed, cases on the more 
‘passive end’ so to speak, such as the feelings involved a compulsive unbidden visualisation 
of one’s loved one being maimed in a car accident, may not have exactly this character. The 
Sartrean view might, nonetheless respond to such examples by limiting the 
																																																						
35 Ibid: 141. 
36 Ibid: 140. 
37 See Ibid: 8-14. 
38 Poellner forthcoming makes this point in his discussion of affective anticipations of future value.  
39 Although Sartre does in a separate work (1994) construe certain types of illusory emotions as in a sense 
chosen in virtue of involving a ‘magical’ transformation of the world, akin to wishful thinking. See Poellner 
2016 for a sympathetic reconstruction of Sartre’s view of emotional experience which aligns it more closely to 
contemporary forms of Perceptualism. 
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phenomenological analysis and claims to putative ‘spontaneous’ instances of affective 
imaginings. 
 
2.3 Implications and Further Issues 
Now, given we find the phenomenological considerations just provided, and the contrasts 
described, plausible, then Sartre has arguably provided grounds for positing ‘two irreducible 
classes of feeling’ – affective perceptions and affective imaginings. Both are, on his view, 
instances of bone fide emotional experience, yet given the stark differences in the way relevant 
different contents modify the respective attendant attitudinal phenomenologies we may be 
led to think that such feelings are mutually exclusive. In Sartre’s terms ‘feelings in the face of 
the irreal’ never appear except in the face of irreal objects, they ‘need non-being in order to 
exist’40, and likewise ‘feelings in the face of the real’, never appear except in the face of real 
objects, they need being in order to exist (to modify the Sartrean jargon here). And as we 
considered at the start of this section, if this Sartrean view holds, it should be clear that the 
same emotional-attitude, different content claim cannot be correct. Affective-imaginings and 
affective-perceptions would mark out fundamentally different attitudinal relations to their 
respective objects; they would be fundamentally different ways of emotionally relating to their 
particular objects as reflected in their different attendant attitudinal phenomenologies. In the 
next section, I consider what responses are open to the emotion theorist who wants to 
maintain the same emotional-attitude, different content claim. In doing so, I also provide support 
for a critical claim which Sartre seems to assume rather than argue for (namely, that in these 
cases the content can and does modify the attitude). 
																																																						
40 Sartre 2004: 146. Sartre’s irreducibility claim is importantly connected to another claim he holds, namely that 
perceptual and imaginative experience are fundamentally different (thus irreducible) and in virtue of this cannot be 
combined in a single experience; they are mutually exclusive experiential modes (see Ibid: 8-16). One can accept 
Sartre’s irreducibility claim qua affective-imaginings and affective-perceptions without accepting this broader 
irreducibility claim about imagination and perception per se. Indeed, there remains the question, one which for 
reasons of space I don’t pursue here, of how the supposedly irreducible affective experiences are related. On 
this issue, one might draw on the idea, familiar from phenomenology, that imaginative attitudes (whether 
suppositional or experiential) are in some sense modifications of other attitudes or modes. In the cases at hand, 
one might say that visualising is in some sense imagining seeing. However, what would have to be guarded against 
– on the Sartrean view – is categorising affective imaginings as mere ‘imagined affects/feelings’ (on the models 
described in section 1). So perhaps one would have to say that while visualising, as ‘imagining seeing’ is a 
modification of perception, and while affective imaginings have such ‘imagining seeing’ as their cognitive bases, 
they are nonetheless not modifications of emotional experiences but sui generis emotional experiences. More 
needs to be said on these complex issues.  
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Before moving on, however, let me briefly say something on four issues concerning the 
previous discussion. First, it might be argued that it is problematic to use love, as Sartre does, 
as a paradigmatic example, since at least according to some emotion theorists love is best 
construed as an enduring sentiment rather than an episodic emotion.41 On this issue one may 
simply replace ‘love’ with amorous feeling, or some such term that makes it clear we are dealing 
with an episodic emotion (and then re-apply the analysis).42 However, to support Sartre’s 
view, it would also be good to see the considerations borne out in a more obvious case of a 
short-lived emotional experience. Take the case of what is often used as the paradigm 
emotion, namely fear. The contrast would then be ‘fear in the face of the real’ vs ‘fear in the 
face of the irreal’ (to repeat Sartre’s way of framing the matter).  
Consider the following detailed example. One dark night while I am sat alone in my living 
room, I see a ghoulish face at the window and am overcome with fear. In keeping with Sartre’s 
phenomenological observations, we might reflect on the way the ‘real correlate’, the ghoulish 
face, does indeed seem to have that ‘inexhaustible depth’ to it connected to the ‘vast halo of 
possibilities’ that surround it: whom could it be, what do they want, why are they here. In addition to 
this, the very presence of the ghoulish face is something which I am passive in relation to; as 
much as I might like it to, it will not disappear, but remains present, with its gaze fixed upon 
me. On the Sartrean picture these features of the ‘real correlate’ determine those ‘feelings’ I 
have toward the ghoulish face, they inherit that depth, ‘feeding off’ the object, and are passive 
or ‘subordinated’ to the object.  
 Contrastingly, consider that I am sat in bed, having earlier in the night heard on the news 
of a recent spike in house robberies. I then find myself visualising a ghoulish face stood at my 
window, and feel afraid. Yet the ‘irreal object’ in this case, according to Sartre, lacks that 
depth described above, it is ‘impoverished’, such that there is no more to it than what I put 
into it; there is no sense of unpredictability – I might choose to develop the visualisation in 
such a way that the ghoulish face becomes an ‘intruder’, but I need not. And as an image I 
maintain through ‘continuous autocreation’, the visualisation has a somewhat ‘active’ 
character to it (it quickly ‘disappears’ as my attention is directed elsewhere, say to the 
																																																						
41 See Lyons 1980, 55, who claims that ‘love’ only has a dispositional usage. One may think that the pressure 
to introduce a distinction between two kinds of attitudes is particularly strong in the case of sentiments. One 
could even be drawn to the view that it is wrong to speak of love if the object does not exist (or more aptly if 
the subject does not take the object to exist), because of the ostensible lack of actual relation. 
42 Note one might also think ‘love’ in the sense of an enduring sentiment is odd to spell out in terms of having 
a perceptual state as a cognitive base (again, amorous feeling would be more appropriate in this respect). 
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chattering of voices on the street below). Now, for Sartre, such ‘fear in the face of the irreal’, 
would plausibly involve feelings that were ‘degraded, poor, jerky, spasmodic, schematic’ as 
reflecting those content-based aspects. So, in this case, we have an example of a more 
paradigmatic episodic emotion that appears, at least in some respects, to bear out the Sartrean 
picture.43 
Second, let me comment on issues of evaluative content in relation to the previous 
discussion in 2.2. As noted in the introduction, according to prominent Evaluativist views, 
emotional experiences represent their objects under evaluative aspects and this is taken as 
central to individuating different emotion types on those views (e.g., fear is individuated, at 
least in part as the emotion which represents the fearsome, admiration as the emotion which 
represents the admirable, and so on). Now if one were tempted by this view, and there are 
considerations in favour of it,44 one might think that affective imaginings would likewise have 
evaluative content; in different terms, one would in some sense enjoy an evaluative (mental) 
image (say visualising the vista as astonishing, the lover as loveable, the ghoulish face as terrifying). 
Sartre himself is drawn to this view, and a reasonably extreme version of it – namely, that 
affective imagining can involve the representation of evaluative features of the ‘image’ 
without at the same time representing any lower-level non-evaluative features.45 However, 
regardless of the problems with that view, it is simply not clear that the question of whether 
we do best to think of emotional experiences as having evaluative content bears on the 
question of the supposed irreducibility of affective perceptions vs affective imaginings as 
accounted for thus far. What is more, Sartre doesn’t rest the case for the relevant phenomenal 
contrasts on, for example, differences between perceptually representing value in the one 
case vs imaginatively representing value it in the other. As such, the case can be made, as it 
has been, for positing two irreducible classes of emotional experience without taking a 
definitive stand on whether emotional experiences necessarily have evaluative content.  
Third, there is an important further contrast between sense-perceptual and experiential 
imagining which I have not emphasised here, namely that of phenomenal-presence vs 
																																																						
43 A critic might note that while some cases can be described in these ways, we have not been shown that all 
must be, such that we have not yet been given sufficient reason to think that what we are describing here 
captures essential features of the relevant phenomena. To show this a fuller range of cases would have to be 
considered. I encourage the reader to, however, consider whether similar considerations do not also plausibly 
apply to a range of other instances of affective imagining vs affective perceptions (e.g., admiration, disgust, indignation, 
anger etc).  
44 Cf. Deonna and Teroni 2012: Ch.6 and Müller 2017. 
45 See Sartre 2004: 70; 139 (cf. Scheler 1973: 17, 195, 253-64; see Poellner 2016: 1-28 for discussion). 
 21 
phenomenal absence. Phenomenal presence is, broadly, to be understood as the object and 
its properties seeming to be spatiotemporally ‘before one’, in a sense that contrasts with the 
way the particular object of experiential imagining is ‘absent’ at least in the sense that involves 
the negation of phenomenal presence. No doubt there are important connections to be 
drawn between this feature and the ‘Depth claim’ and ‘Passivity claim’ (and their negations 
in the imagination case). It is worth briefly noting that this contrast is not to be confused 
with the idea that sense-perception ‘posits its object’ as existing, whereas imagination 
necessarily does not. Since the latter is false; while imagination concerned with fiction, for 
example, may take this character (and so this is a possible way imagination posits its object, 
namely as not-existing),46 it need not. Sartre documents three other ways imagination posits 
it objects; ‘as absent’ (say in the case of visualising Annie who is away on holiday) ‘as existing 
elsewhere’ (say in the case of visualising the Eiffel Tower in Paris), and as ‘neutral’ (see Sartre 
2004: 13), which is best construed as simply not ‘taking a stand’ on whether the object exists.47 
In any case, we can set these issues aside for our discussion here.    
Finally, somewhat connected to the above, it should be noted that the fundamental 
contrast we have discussed is that between affective imagining and affective perception. 
Now, it might be said that this distinction isn’t obviously exhaustive. For example, consider 
an emotion felt in response to a particular object which is absent but is represented as such 
via the cognitive base of a judgement, say propositional remembering. For example, a felt 
sadness in response to a judgement where one propositionally remembers that a loved one 
is no more. In such a case the particular object (the loved one) is not present or at least not 
given as such, just as the object isn’t in affective imagining. Now on this issue it appears the 
defender of the Sartrean view we have been considering has two main options. The first is a 
weaker and more profligate position. Namely, that there may well be a further class, perhaps 
affective judgements, that while sharing certain features with affective imaginings (or at least in 
the case where the object is posited as ‘absent’) nonetheless might have their own proprietary 
phenomenology which will clearly not exhibit the ‘depth’ or ‘passivity’ of sense-perception 
and related affective perception. Although more phenomenological analysis of the specific 
																																																						
46 See Teroni 2019: 113–128, for discussion of the fictional case, and the respective contributions of attitude 
and content on correctness conditions for the relevant states.  
47 For further discussion see Sartre 2004: 13-14. It is further question of how the ‘irreal’ relates to the varieties 
of ‘positing as nothingness’ mentioned here. For sake of space I bracket discussion of this issue for a separate 
occasion. 	
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case of judgement would be required to spell out in detail precisely what the character of 
such affective judgements (note as experiential emotions), if there are such, amount to. 
The second, arguably stronger position, and more in keeping with Sartre’s own analysis is 
as follows. All emotional experiences in which the particular object is not given by way of 
perception, that is in which the cognitive base is not a perceptual experience, should be 
classified as affective imaginings. Such a position would allow the Sartrean in this instance to 
maintain the idea of two fundamental classes of emotional experience, namely affective 
perceptions and affective imaginings. What can be said in favour of this option?  One might 
insist that in the case of bone fide emotional experiences there is the necessity of some experiential 
content being in play, and that in absence of sense-perception (as the cognitive base) providing 
such content, some form of experiential imagining is required. Cases in which there is strictly 
neither sense-perception nor some form of experiential imagining as the cognitive base of the 
emotion, would, therefore, have to be analysed as something akin to cases of fearing that which 
don’t report episodic emotional experiences, but perhaps only dispositions to undergo such 
emotions. Contrastingly, in the case of a bone fide emotional experience in which the cognitive 
base is say, a verbally entertained belief or a judgement, there will also be some experiential 
imagining or ‘simulating’ of relevant features of the particular object, ‘visualised’ in some way 
or other (this could of course be relatively indeterminate). While there is certainly something 
to be said for this second option, more explication of these options would be required in a 
full-dress defence of the Sartrean picture on this issue. 
 
3. Responses to the Sartrean View 
The main pattern of argument of the previous section was that of moving from 
phenomenological reflections concerning contrasting features of sense-perceptual 
experience vs experiential imagining to then suggesting that in the relevant contrasting 
emotional cases these features lead to a modification of the relevant attendant attitudinal 
phenomenologies. If accepted, this motivates the positing of two distinct affective-attitudinal 
relations depending on whether the object is ‘real’ or ‘irreal’. And as noted if this holds then 
the same emotional-attitude, different content claim is mistaken: such a claim cannot be upheld as a 
way of capturing those cases and individuating emotion types at the level of attitude without 
reference to content (or more specifically now, without reference to the way the respective 
contents modify the felt attitudes involved).  
What possible responses are open to the defender of the same-emotional attitude, different 
content claim? One route might be to take issue with Sartre’s characterisations of sense-
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perceptual experience and experiential imagining. However, the claims that were presented 
in the previous section are reasonably plausible. Broadly, the idea that sense-perceptual 
experience has a ‘depth’ to it in terms of its objects and their properties, which is connected 
to how we learn about the objects of such experience, that experiential imagining doesn’t, is 
along the right lines. And further to this, Sartre’s claim that the subject’s relation is at least 
more passive in the sense-perceptual case, and at least more active in experiential imagining 
likewise seems on the right track. No doubt there are further contrasts to be made, but the 
features Sartre draws on in his characterisations are relatively uncontroversial and provide 
basic criteria for distinguishing those experiential modes. The danger in rejecting these 
characterisations would be in providing suitable alternatives which would likely have to bring 
sense-perceptual experience and experiential imagining much closer in terms of their 
respective phenomenologies, while still maintaining enough difference to allow for 
(reasonably easy) recognition of them as distinct experiential modes. Note though, this is not 
to claim that the Sartrean view would be committed to infallibility for our recognitional 
capacity for differentiating sense-perception vs imagination, such that we never make errors 
in this respect (as perhaps demonstrated in the ‘Perky experiments’).48   
A second response might be to insist that in fact, we can still describe the contrast cases 
as instances of the same attitude. After all, is it not the case that experiential love for Annie when 
she is present and experiential love for Annie when she is absent are still both categorised as 
instances of love, putative phenomenal contrasts notwithstanding (ditto for the fear cases)? 
It is certainly true that if correct, the phenomenological reflections provided by Sartre require 
us to deny that the attitude terms featuring in the surface grammar of reports of the 
respective emotions serve as an accurate guide to the actual type (or perhaps better: 
phenomenal type) of emotion we are dealing with at the fundamental level (which for Sartre is 
the phenomenological level). In this sense, the Sartrean view need not deny that insofar as 
what we are doing is analysing the surface grammar of reports of emotion, and using the way 
emotion-attitude terms figure therein as our guide to individuate emotion-types, then we can 
describe such cases as exhibiting the same emotional-attitude towards different contents.  
The problem is that Sartre has given us grounds for thinking that the surface grammar of 
such reports (at least if they purport to report episodic emotional experiences) as displaying the 
same attitude is misleading when it comes to understanding the nature and complexity of the 
relevant experiences, insofar as such reports potentially conceal deeper level 
																																																						
48 Although see Segal 1971 concerning problems of replicability with these experiments. 
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phenomenological contrasts (naturally they may also in different respects reveal phenomenal 
commonalities). This rejoinder also taps into a broader issue about the relevant criteria 
appealed to in type-individuation of emotion-types. If what such individuation aims at is 
something which is supposed to, at least in part, reflect the nuanced phenomenology of these 
emotional episodes (their relatively experienced similarities and differences), such that 
individuating emotional experiences is a personal level first-person phenomenologically 
informed project – as most contemporary emotion theorists maintain it is49 – then the above 
response of baldly appealing to the terms which figure in reports of emotion arguably fails 
to sufficiently engage with the manifest phenomenological complexity of the episodes in 
question.  
Consider, however, the following response from a defender of an ‘attitudinal theory’, who 
we have said has difficulties accounting for the differences brought to light by Sartre. They 
might acknowledge that there are two fundamental classes of emotional experiences, namely 
affective perceptions and imaginings, but seek to explain this exclusively in attitudinal terms. 
How might this response be developed? First, the defender of such an approach might 
willingly concede that there is a manifest phenomenological difference between being sad 
about a particular object presented directly (perceptually) and one that is affective imagined (for 
example, the anticipated death of a friend). The phenomenological difference is a fairly 
substantive one, so the appeal exclusively to attitudes to explain this difference will require a 
‘rich phenomenology’ in the attitude component of the respective emotions. Given this, it 
might be said that we can explain this phenomenal contrast in terms of the different bodily 
attitudes involved in such a case, perhaps along the lines of Deonna and Teroni’s specification 
of emotions as attitudes of felt action readiness (so with action-ready bodily 
phenomenology).50 If we require a further explanation of the difference in bodily attitudes, 
we could then appeal to the idea that subject has different beliefs or knowledge concerning 
the relevant temporal and or modal properties of the particular objects.  
First, it should be noted that this marks a significant concession to the Sartrean view, 
namely that there are two fundamentally classes of emotional experiences, a concession, it should be 
noted, which is not in keeping with the idea that emotions are just so many different attitudes 
towards a range of contents provided by their cognitive bases. Remember, we said at the 
outset that for an attitudinalist who accepts the same-emotional attitude/different content claim, 
																																																						
49 Indeed, Deonna and Teroni provide their own account of the suppose attendant attitudinal phenomenology 
(see 2012: Ch.7; 2015) 
50 See Deonna and Teroni 2012; Ch.7; 2015. 
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the fact that the cognitive base differs – say between fear towards a sense-perceptually 
present particular object and fear towards a visualised particular object (the relevant basing 
states being sense perception in the one case and experiential imagining in the other) – should 
not fundamentally determine the emotional experience as the type of emotional experience 
it is. Insofar as the attitudinalist now concedes that there are fundamental classes of emotional 
experiences, namely affective perceptions and imaginings, then it appears that claim, at least 
without significant qualification, cannot stand.  
Second, and in more critical response to the substance of the alternative proposal, it might 
be said that an explanation of the relevant phenomenological differences across the cases in 
terms of different bodily attitudes overlooks the fact that there are cases in which affective 
perception and affective imagining are on a parallel with respect to any putative bodily 
phenomenology (action ready or otherwise). For example, consider the case of feeling moved 
by a piece of music I am currently listening to, and feeling moved by a piece of music I, in 
experiential imaging, recall hearing. While the episodes evince an obvious phenomenal 
contrast (as per Sartre’s argument), is it really plausible to think that we are to explain such 
differences by appeal solely to some attendant bodily attitudinal difference? In both cases it 
seems plausible to think that any bodily phenomenology in these cases is muted, absent, or 
indeed sufficient similar, such that it seems implausible to appeal to a difference in bodily 
attitude to explain the more dramatic phenomenal contracts between affective perception and 
affective imagining which Sartre highlights. Indeed, it is a broader problem for bodily-
attitudinal theories of emotion that there seem to be a range of certain ‘cool’ or ‘calm’ 
emotional experiences, such as admiration, reverence, and regret, which can occur without 
any distinctive attendant bodily phenomenology. 51 If that is so, then such bodily attitudes can 
hardly be recruited to explain phenomenal contrasts across relevant ‘non-bodily’ cases of 
affective perception vs affective imagining.   
And remember, it is uncontroversial that an emotional experience directed towards a 
sense-perceptually present object will motivate conduct in a significantly different way from an 
emotional experience directed towards a particular object given in experiential imagining. 
But these kinds of motivations to act in specific ways (and the kinds of bodily attitudes they 
involve), are plausibly motivational attitudes downstream of the emotional experience itself, 
which the latter motivates (and indeed it may be said to be these downstream motivational 
attitudes which are typically dependent on certain beliefs or knowledge about the relevant 
																																																						
51 For authors who make this kind of claim, see Lambie 2009: 272-280; Poellner 2016: 13; Prinz 2004: 57, 72; 
James 1884: 191, cf. Ibid: 201-2. 
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temporal and or modal properties of the particular object, which are surely not often explicit 
in the emotional experience itself). As such they cannot be appealed to in a putatively 
exclusively attitudinal explanation of the relevant phenomenal differences between the 
emotional experiences of affective perception and affective imaginings in and of themselves (as 
we might put it). So, while more would need to be said to completely rule out this response 
from the attitudinalist, the above considerations should give pause for thought about the 
plausibility of this strategy.  
The final response to the Sartrean picture advocated here, and by far the most substantive, 
is to put pressure on what is the central unargued assumption or move in the Sartrean 
considerations presented in the previous section, and which I flagged near the end of the 
preceding section as a lacuna in Sartre’s account. Namely, that content-based features, taken 
up from the relevant cognitive bases, in cases of putative affective perception and affective 
imagination, modify the ‘feelings’ involved, that is modify the attendant attitudinal 
phenomenologies (and do so with different results). If it can be shown that this is simply not 
the case, then the Sartrean view that we need to posit two irreducible classes of emotional 
experiences, will lose its motivation.  
First, it bears noting that Sartre himself doesn’t provide anything by way of an argument 
for what we might call this feeling modification claim. Rather he just seems to take it as obviously 
true, as manifest from a detailed phenomenological reflection on the contrasts between the 
objects and feelings involved in the relevant cases. While we might be tempted to likewise 
re-emphasise what Sartre would insist are manifest phenomenological differences, 
undoubtedly it would be preferable if Sartre’s view could be supplemented with additional 
independently plausible considerations (although what follows will certainly not be an 
exhaustive defence of this claim).  
Let me first note that the Sartrean view under consideration should not be confused with 
and is not equivalent to the simpler uncontroversial one that the overall phenomenology of 
putative affective imaginings and affective perceptions differ. After all, insofar as we accept 
that intentional content is a significant determinant of overall phenomenal character – how 
the object seems to me partly determines the what-it-is-like-ness of the experience – we could 
explain such differences in phenomenology solely in terms of the ‘object-side’, as it were (in 
terms of differences in intentional content). The Sartrean feeling modification claim is more 
distinctive than that: remember the idea is that the way those content-based differences affect 
the ‘feelings themselves’, that is the attitudinal character of the emotion, is sufficiently 
different across the cases we are considering in a way which renders them mutually exclusive: 
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on the Sartrean view I simply couldn’t have those ‘spasmodic, schematic, degraded’ feelings 
in response to a sense-perceptually present object any more than I could have these ‘deep, 
rich, inexhaustive’ feelings in response to a ‘irreal’ object. 
So, under pressure to provide more of a defence of the feeling modification claim, or at least 
considerations which go beyond just accepting as correct Sartre’s phenomenological 
descriptions and the inferences he draws from them, the following can be said. In the first 
instance, one might think the feeling modification claim is connected to an arguably less 
contentious point about emotional experience whose credence is in better standing, or at 
least is easier to understand. Stepping away from the technical detail, it is little more than a 
truism to say the ‘feelings’ involved in any given emotional experience, as responses or reactions 
to their particular object, will to more or less extent reflect manifest aspects of the object. 
Consider the following examples. The object which provokes intense feelings of fear (however 
precisely characterised), will typically be one which the subject experiences as having ‘intense’ 
aspects or characteristics (perhaps loudness, speed, aggression etc.);52 alternatively, the 
particular object which motivates calm feelings of serenity (however precisely characterised), will 
typically be one which the subject experiences as exhibiting ‘serene’ characteristics (slowness, 
pale colours, flow, etc.). Call this the reflecting feeling claim. The broad idea is that the ‘feelings’ 
we enjoy in emotional experiences, the affective dimension of our experience, to more or 
less extent, will reflect relevant characteristics or aspects of the object which are manifest to 
us. Put otherwise, there is an undeniably close link (some might say inseparability) in 
emotional experience between how the object seems and how it makes us feel.  
Yet, once something in the region of the reflecting feeling claim is conceded, and we also 
admit of Sartre’s characterisations of the manifest content-based differences between the 
‘real’ and the ‘irreal’ object (which as we saw above we might think relatively uncontentious), 
then the feeling modification claim and the positing of two mutually exclusive types of emotions 
in terms of affective-perceptions and affective-imaginings looks difficult to resist. The 
Sartrean view under consideration seems to have uncovered manifest aspects or 
characteristics of the ‘real’ vs ‘irreal’ object’ in general, which are sufficiently different and 
are reflected in the ‘feelings they provoke’, such that we a drawn to posit a difference in 
type.53 Note importantly, the Sartrean claim is not that any difference in emotional feeling, demands 
																																																						
52 Naturally one might seek to cash this out further in terms of an evaluative property, such that the ‘intensity’ of 
fear for example correlates to how acute the threat is to which I respond with fear.  
53 Perhaps one might insist that the strong conclusion that there can be no common fundamental type (such 
as love or fear) to instances of these classes does not follow. However, on the Sartrean picture at least, such a 
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a recognition of a difference in type. Take the case of fear: we can allow that low-level fear 
and intense fear are both instances of the same type. After all, it is surely common-sense that 
we can have the same emotion at various levels of intensity, which as such ‘feel different’. 
Rather, the claim is that the kinds of differences in emotional feeling which we have come 
to recognise in specifically the case of ‘feelings in the face of the real’ vs ‘feelings in the face of 
the irreal’ are sufficient in that particular contrast case to motivate a distinction in type. No 
doubt, more needs to be said in justification of the feeling modification claim. However, in the 
cases discussed and the phenomenological descriptions provided by Sartre, it certainly enjoys 
plausibility, especially when we see it as connected to a broader point about the close link in 
emotional experience between how the object seems and how it makes us feel. 
 
Conclusion 
I conclude this paper by reflecting, briefly, on how the discussion bears more broadly on the 
theory of emotion. One consequence for the theory of emotion, and specifically the central 
project of individuating emotional experiences, is that there is a need for closer attention to 
relations between content-based and attitude-based (or affective) aspects of emotional 
experiences. Even if one remains unconvinced by the Sartrean view in terms of the positing 
of two fundamental classes of emotional experiences, it should be clear that we should avoid 
trying to carve off either the ‘attitudinal-side’ or the ‘content-side’ as the key to individuating 
emotion types, and rather examine in more detail the way attitude and content may combine 
and influence each other.  
Naturally, if Sartre’s view is on the right track, that relation between attitude and content 
can be manifest in a modification of the very type of emotion we are undergoing. Further to 
this, while more needs to be done to flesh out the details of affective-imaginings in particular, 
the hope is that by recognising them as a distinctive class of emotional experiences, rather 
than merely emotional experiences which happen to have experiential imaginings as their 
cognitive bases, we can further characterise them in a way which reflects their unique 






‘fundamental type’ would be little more than a convention-driven non-phenomenal classification, unreflective 
of manifest kind or type differences at the level of the experiences themselves.   
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